Scenario
A company is hosting a sealed-bid auction where bidders independently submit bids without knowing the others’ bids.
The item is awarded to the highest bidder, and they pay their bid amount (a first-price auction).
We will simulate the auction process for $10$ bidders, each with a valuation drawn randomly from a uniform distribution between $$50$ and $$100$.
Bidders place bids by shading their valuations by a fraction.
The optimal shading strategy depends on the auction type.
Python Implementation
Here is the $Python$ code to simulate and analyze this auction:
1 | import numpy as np |
Explanation of the Code
- Valuations:
Each bidder’s valuation is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution.
This represents their willingness to pay. - Bids:
A simple shading strategy is applied where each bidder bids $80$% of their valuation. - Winner Determination:
The highest bid determines the winner, and their valuation and index are recorded. - Visualization:
The bar chart compares valuations and bids, highlighting the winner.
Explanation of the Results
1. Valuations vs. Bids
- The blue bars represent the valuations of the $10$ bidders.
These are the true amounts each bidder is willing to pay. - The orange bars represent the bids submitted by the bidders.
The bids are shaded down to $80$% of their valuations, as per the strategy.
2. Winning Bid
- The red dot marks the winning bid ($78.03$), submitted by Bidder $1$.
- The winner’s valuation ($97.54$) is the highest among all bidders, which aligns with the competitive nature of a first-price auction.
3. Bidder Strategy
- Since bidders bid only $80$% of their true valuations, no one submits their full willingness to pay.
This is typical in a first-price auction because bidders want to maximize their surplus (difference between valuation and payment).
4. Observations
- Bidder $1$ wins the auction because their bid of $78.03$ is the highest among all bidders.
- Bidders with higher valuations tend to submit higher bids, as seen in the general trend where valuations (blue) and bids (orange) align proportionally.
Conclusion
This example highlights the effect of strategic bidding in a first-price auction:
- Bidders shade their bids below their valuations to achieve a positive surplus.
- The winner is determined based on the highest bid, but they still pay less than their full valuation.
This behavior illustrates the trade-off between winning and maximizing surplus in competitive auctions.